"What the Sokal Hoax Ought to Teach Us" :
What the Sokal Hoax Ought to Teach Us
The pernicious consequences and internal contradictions of
"postmodernist" relativism
Paul A. Boghossian
From the Times Literary Supplement, Commentary.
December 13, 1996, pp.14-15
In the autumn of 1994, New York University theoretical physicist, Alan Sokal,
submitted an essay to Social Text, the leading journal in the field
of cultural
studies. Entitled "Transgressing
the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative
Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity," it purported to be a scholarly
article about
the "postmodern" philosophical and political implications of
twentieth century
physical theories. However, as the author himself later revealed in the
journal Lingua Franca, his essay was merely a farrago of deliberately concocted
solecisms, howlers and non-sequiturs, stitched together so as to look good and
to flatter the ideological preconceptions of the editors. After review by five
members of Social Text's editorial board, Sokal's parody was
accepted for
publication as a serious piece of scholarship. It appeared in April 1996, in a
special double issue of the journal devoted to rebutting the charge that
cultural studies critiques of science tend to be riddled with incompetence.
Sokal's hoax is fast acquiring the status of a classic succes de
scandale, with
extensive press coverage in the United States and to a growing extent in Europe
and Latin America. In the United States, over twenty public forums devoted to
the topic have either taken place or are scheduled, including packed sessions at
Princeton, Duke, The University of
Michigan, and New York University. But what
exactly should it be taken to show?
I believe it shows three important things. First, that dubiously
coherent
relativistic views about the concepts of truth and evidence really have gained
wide acceptance within the contemporary academy, just as it has often seemed.
Second, that this has had precisely the sorts of pernicious consequence for
standards of scholarship and intellectual responsibility that one would expect
it to have. Finally, that neither of the preceding two claims need reflect a
particular political point of view, least of all a conservative one.
It's impossible to do justice to the egregiousness of Sokal's essay
without
quoting it more or less in its entirety; what follows is a tiny sampling. Sokal
starts off by establishing his postmodernist credentials: he derides scientists
for continuing to cling to the "dogma imposed by the long post-Enlightenment
hegemony over the Western intellectual outlook," that there exists an external
world, whose properties are independent of human beings, and that human beings
can obtain reliable, if imperfect and tentative knowledge of these properties
"by hewing to the 'objective' procedures and epistemological strictures
prescribed by the (so-called) scientific method." He asserts that this
'dogma'
has already been thoroughly undermined by the theories of general relativity and
quantum mechanics, and that physical reality has been shown to be "at bottom a
social and linguistic construct." In support of this he adduces nothing more
than a couple of pronouncements from physicists Niels Bohr and Werner
Heisenberg, pronouncements that have been shown to be naive by sophisticated
discussions in the philosophy of science over the past fifty years.
Sokal then picks up steam, moving to his central thesis that recent
developments
within quantum gravity -- an emerging and still-speculative physical
theory -- go
much further, substantiating not only postmodern denials of the objectivity of
truth, but also the beginnings of a kind of physics that would be truly
"liberatory," of genuine service to progressive political causes. Here his
`reasoning' becomes truly venturesome, as he contrives to generate political and
cultural conclusions from the physics of the very, very small. His inferences
are mediated by nothing more than a hazy patchwork of puns (especially on the
words 'linear' and 'discontinuous'), strained analogies, bald
assertions and
what can only be described as non-sequiturs of numbing grossness
(to use a
phrase that Peter Strawson applied to the far less deserving Immanuel Kant).
For example, he moves immediately from Bohr's observation that in quantum
mechanics "a complete elucidation of one and the same object may require diverse
points of view" to:
In such a situation, how can a self-perpetuating secular priesthood of
credentialed "scientists" purport to maintain a monopoly on the production of
scientific knowledge? 'The content and methodology of postmodern science
thus
provide powerful intellectual support for the progressive political project,
understood in its broadest sense: the transgressing of boundaries, the breaking
down of barriers, the radical democratization of all aspects of social,
economic, political and cultural life.
He concludes by calling for the development of a correspondingly
emancipated
mathematics, one that, by not being based on standard (Zermelo-Fraenkel) set
theory, would no longer constrain the progressive and postmodern ambitions of
emerging physical science.
As if all this weren't enough, en passant, Sokal peppers his
piece with
as
many
smaller bits of transparent nonsense as could be made to fit on any given page.
Some of these are of a purely mathematical or scientific nature -- that
the
well-known geometrical constant pi is a variable, that complex number theory,
which dates from the nineteenth century and is taught to schoolchildren, is a
new and speculative branch of mathematical physics, that the crackpot New Age
fantasy of a 'morphogenetic field' constitutes a leading theory of
quantum
gravity. Others have to do with the alleged philosophical or political
implications of basic science -- that quantum field theory confirms
Lacan's
psychoanalytic speculations about the nature of the neurotic subject, that fuzzy
logic is better suited to leftist political causes than classical logic, that
Bell's theorem, a technical result in the foundations of quantum
mechanics,
supports a claimed linkage between quantum theory and "industrial discipline in
the early bourgeois epoch." Throughout, Sokal quotes liberally and approvingly
from the writings of leading postmodern theorists, including several editors of Social Text, passages that are often breathtaking in their
combination of
self-confidence and absurdity.
Commentators have made much of the scientific, mathematical and philosophical
illiteracy that an acceptance of Sokal's ingeniously contrived gibberish
would
appear to betray. But talk about illiteracy elides an important distinction
between two different explanations of what might have led the editors to decide
to publish Sokal's piece. One is that, although they understood perfectly
well
what the various sentences of his article actually mean, they found them
plausible, whereas he, along with practically everybody else, doesn't.
This
might brand them as kooky, but wouldn't impugn their motives. The other
hypothesis is that they actually had very little idea what many of the sentences
mean, and so were not in a position to evaluate them for plausibility in the
first place. The plausibility, or even the intelligibility, of Sokal's
arguments just didn't enter into their deliberations.
I think it's very clear, and very important, that it's the second hypothesis
that's true. To see why consider, by way of example, the following passage from
Sokal's essay:
Just as liberal feminists are frequently content with a minimal agenda
of legal
and social equality for women and are "pro-choice," so liberal (and even some
socialist) mathematicians are often content to work within the hegemonic
Zermelo-Fraenkel framework (which, reflecting its nineteenth-century origins,
already incorporates the axiom of equality) supplemented only by the axiom of
choice. But this framework is grossly insufficient for a liberatory mathematics,
as was proven long ago by Cohen 1966.
It's very hard to believe that an editor who knew what the various
ingredient
terms actually mean would not have raised an eyebrow at this passage. For the
axiom of equality in set theory simply provides a definition of when it is that
two sets are the same set, namely, when they have the same members; obviously,
this has nothing to do with liberalism, or, indeed, with a political philosophy
of any stripe. Similarly, the axiom of choice simply says that, given any
collection of mutually exclusive sets, there is always a set consisting of
exactly one member from each of those sets. Again, this clearly has nothing to
do with the issue of choice in the abortion debate. But even if one were
somehow able to see one's way clear -- I can't -- to explaining this
first
quoted sentence in terms of the postmodern love for puns and wordplay, what
would explain the subsequent sentence? Paul Cohen's 1966 proves that the
question whether or not there is a number between two other particular
(transfinite cardinal) numbers isn't settled by the axioms of
Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory. How could this conceivably count as a proof that Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory is inadequate for the purposes of a "liberatory mathematics,"
whatever precisely that is supposed to be. Wouldn't any editor who knew
what
Paul Cohen had actually proved in 1966 have required just a little more by way
of explanation here, in order to make the connection just a bit more
perspicuous?
Since one could cite dozens of similar passages --
Sokal goes out of
his way to
leave telltale clues as to his true intent -- the
conclusion is inescapable that
the editors of Social Text didn't know what many of the sentences
in
Sokal's
essay actually meant; and that they just didn't care. How could a group
of
scholars, editing what is supposed to be the leading journal in a given field,
allow themselves such a sublime indifference to the content, truth and
plausibility of a scholarly submission accepted for publication?
By way of explanation, coeditors Andrew Ross and Bruce Robbins have
said that as
"a non-refereed journal of political opinion and cultural analysis produced by
an editorial collective" Social Text has always seen itself in the
`little
magazine' tradition of the independent left as much as in the academic
domain."
But it's hard to see this as an adequate explanation; presumably, even a
journal
of political opinion should care whether what it publishes is intelligible.
What Ross and Co. should have said, it seems to me, is that Social
Text is a
political magazine in a deeper and more radical sense: under appropriate
circumstances, it is prepared to let agreement with its ideological orientation
trump every other criterion for publication, including something as basic as
sheer intelligibility. The prospect of being able to display in their pages a
natural scientist -- a physicist, no less -- throwing the full weight
of his
authority behind their cause was compelling enough for them to overlook the fact
that they didn't have much of a clue exactly what sort of support they
were
being offered. And this, it seems to me, is what's at the heart of the
issue
raised by Sokal's hoax: not the mere existence of incompetence within the
academy, but rather that specific form of it that arises from allowing
ideological criteria to displace standards of scholarship so completely that not
even considerations of intelligibility are seen as relevant to an
argument's
acceptability. How, given the recent and sorry history of ideologically
motivated conceptions of knowledge -- Lysenkoism in Stalin's Soviet
Union, for
example, or Nazi critiques of `Jewish science' -- could it again have
become
acceptable to behave in this way?
The complete historical answer is a long story,
but there can be little
doubt
that one of its crucial components is the brush-fire spread, within vast sectors
of the humanities and social sciences, of the cluster of simple-minded
relativistic views about truth and evidence that are commonly identified as
`postmodernist'. These views license, and on the most popular versions
insist
upon, the substitution of political and ideological criteria for the
historically more familiar assessment in terms of truth, evidence and argument.
Most philosophers accept the claim that there is no such thing as a
totally
disinterested inquirer, one who approaches his or her topic utterly devoid of
any prior assumptions, values or biases. Postmodernism goes well beyond this
historicist observation, as feminist scholar Linda Nicholson explains (without
necessarily endorsing):
The traditional historicist claim that all inquiry is inevitably
influenced by
the values of the inquirer provides a very weak counter to the norm of
objectivity" [T]he more radical move in the postmodern turn was to claim that
the very criteria demarcating the true and the false, as well as such related
distinctions as science and myth or fact and superstition, were internal to the
traditions of modernity and could not be legitimized outside of those
traditions. Moreover, it was argued that the very development and use of such
criteria, as well as their extension to ever wider domains, had to be described
as representing the growth and development of `specific regimes of
power.'
(From the "Introduction" to her anthology, Feminism and
Postmodernism)
As Nicholson sees, historicism, however broadly understood, doesn't entail that
there is no such thing as objective truth. To concede that no one ever believes
something solely because it's true is not to deny that anything is
objectively
true. Furthermore, the concession that no inquirer or inquiry is fully
bias-free doesn't entail that they can't be more or less bias-free, or
that
their biases can't be more or less damaging. To concede that the truth is never
the only thing that someone is tracking isn't to deny that some people or
methods are better than others at staying on its track.
Historicism leaves intact, then, both the claim that one's aim should
be
to
arrive at conclusions that are objectively true and justified, independently of
any particular perspective, and that science is the best idea that anyone has
had about how to satisfy that aim. Postmodernism, in seeking to demote science
from the privileged epistemic position it has come to occupy, and thereby to
blur the distinction between it and `other ways of knowing, -- myth and
superstition, for example -- needs to go much further than historicism,
all the
way to the denial that objective truth is a coherent aim that inquiry may have.
Indeed, according to postmodernism, the very development and use of the rhetoric
of objectivity, far from embodying a serious metaphysics and epistemology of
truth and evidence, represents a mere play for power, a way of silencing these
`other ways of knowing'. It follows, given this standpoint, that the
struggle
against the rhetoric of objectivity isn't primarily an intellectual
matter, but
a political one: the rhetoric needs to be defeated, rather than just refuted.
Against this backdrop, it becomes very easy to explain the behavior of the
editors of Social Text.
Although it may be hard to understand how anyone could actually hold
views as
extreme as these, their ubiquity these days is a distressingly familiar
fact. A
front-page article in the New York Times of October 22, 1996
provided a recent
illustration. The article concerned the conflict between two views of where
Native American populations originated -- the scientific archeological
account,
and the account offered by some Native American creation myths. According to
the former extensively confirmed view, humans first entered the Americas from
Asia, crossing the Bering Strait over 10,000 years ago. By contrast, some
Native American creation accounts hold that native peoples have lived in the
Americas ever since their ancestors first emerged onto the surface of the earth
from a subterranean world of spirits. The Times noted that many
archeologists,
torn between their commitment to scientific method and their appreciation for
native culture, "have been driven close to a postmodern relativism in which
science is just one more belief system." Roger Anyon, a British archeologist who
has worked for the Zuni people, was quoted as saying: "Science is just one of
many ways of knowing the world".[The Zunis' world view is] just as valid
as the
archeological viewpoint of what prehistory is about."
How are we to make sense of this? (Sokal himself mentioned this
example at a
recent public forum in New York and was taken to task by Andrew Ross for putting
Native Americans "on trial." But this issue isn't about Native American
views;
it's about postmodernism.) The claim that the Zuni myth can be "just as
valid"
as the archeological theory can be read in one of three different ways, between
which postmodern theorists tend not to distinguish sufficiently: as a claim
about truth, as a claim about justification, or as a claim about purpose. As we
shall see, however, none of these claims is even remotely plausible.
Interpreted as a claim about truth, the suggestion would be that the
Zuni and
archeological views are equally true. On the face of it, though, this is
impossible, since they contradict each other. One says, or implies, that the
first humans in the Americas came from Asia; the other says, or implies, that
they did not, that they came from somewhere else, a subterranean world of
spirits. How could a claim and its denial both be true? If I say that the
earth is flat, and you say that it's round, how could we both be right?
Postmodernists like to respond to this sort of point by saying that
both claims
can be true because both are true relative to some perspective or other, and
there can be no question of truth outside of perspectives. Thus, according to
the Zuni perspective, the first humans in the Americas came from a subterranean
world; and according to the Western scientific perspective, the first humans
came from Asia. Since both are true according to some perspective or other,
both are true.
But to say that some claim is true according to some perspective sounds
simply
like a fancy way of saying that someone, or some group, believes it. The
crucial question concerns what we are to say when what I believe -- what's
true
according to my perspective -- conflicts with what you believe -- with
what's true
according to your perspective? The one thing not to say, it seems to me, on
pain of utter unintelligibility, is that both claims are true.
This should be obvious, but can also be seen by applying the view to
itself.
For consider: If a claim and its opposite can be equally true provided that
there is some perspective relative to which each is true, then, since there is a
perspective -- realism -- relative to which it's true that a claim and
its
opposite cannot both be true, postmodernism would have to admit that it itself
is just as true as its opposite, realism. But postmodernism cannot afford to
admit that: presumably, its whole point is that realism is false. Thus, we see
that the very statement of postmodernism, construed as a view about truth,
undermines itself: facts about truth independent of particular perspectives are
presupposed by the view itself.
How does it fare when considered as a claim about evidence or
justification? So
construed, the suggestion comes to the claim that the Zuni story and the
archeological theory are equally justified, given the available evidence. Now,
in contrast with the case of truth, it is not incoherent for a claim and its
negation to be equally justified, for instance, in cases where there is very
little evidence for either side. But, prima facie, anyway, this isn't the sort
of case that's at issue, for according to the available evidence, the
archeological theory is far better confirmed than the Zuni myth.
To get the desired relativistic result, a
postmodernist would have to
claim that
the two views are equally justified given their respective rules of
evidence,
and add that there is no objective fact of the matter which set of rules is to
be preferred. Given this relativization of justification to the rules of
evidence characteristic of a given perspective, the archeological theory would
be justified relative to the rules of evidence of Western science, and the Zuni
story would be justified relative to the rules of evidence employed by the
relevant tradition of myth-making. Furthermore, since there are no
perspective-independent rules of evidence that could adjudicate between these
two sets of rules, both claims would be equally justified and there could be no
choosing between them.
Once again, however, there is a problem not merely with plausibility,
but with
self-refutation. For suppose we grant that every rule of evidence is as good as
any other. Then any claim could be made to count as justified simply by
formulating an appropriate rule of evidence relative to which it is justified.
Indeed, it would follow that we could justify the claim that not every rule of
evidence is as good as any other, thereby forcing the postmodernist to concede
that his views about truth and justification are just as justified as his
opponent's. Presumably, however, the postmodernist needs to hold that his views
are better than his opponent's; otherwise what's to recommend them? On the other
hand, if some rules of evidence can be said to be better than others, then there
must be perspective-independent facts about what makes them better and a
thoroughgoing relativism about justification is false.
It is sometimes suggested that the intended sense in which the Zuni
myth is
"just as valid" has nothing to do with truth or justification, but rather with
the different purposes that the myth subserves, in contrast with those of
science. According to this line of thought, science aims to give to give a
descriptively accurate account of reality, whereas the Zuni myth belongs to the
realm of religious practice and the constitution of cultural identity. It is to
be regarded as having symbolic, emotional, and ritual purposes other than the
mere description of reality. And as such, it may serve those purposes very well
-- better, perhaps, than the archeologist's account.
The trouble with this as a reading of "just as valid" is not so much
that it's
false, but that it's irrelevant to the issue at hand: even if it were granted,
it couldn't help advance the cause of postmodernism. For if the Zuni myth isn't
taken to compete with the archeological theory, as a descriptively accurate
account of prehistory, its existence has no prospect of casting any doubt on the
objectivity of the account delivered by science. If I say that the earth is
flat, and you make no assertion at all, but instead tell me an interesting
story, that has no potential for raising deep issues about the objectivity of
what either of us said or did.
Is there, perhaps, a weaker thesis that, while being more defensible
than these
simple-minded relativisms, would nevertheless yield an anti-objectivist result?
It's hard to see what such a thesis would be. Stanley Fish, for example, in
seeking to discredit Sokal's characterization of postmodernism, offers the
following (Opinion piece, The New York Times):
What sociologists of science say is that of course the world is real and
independent of our observations but that accounts of the world are produced by
observers and are therefore relative to their capacities, education and
training, etc. It is not the world or its properties but the vocabularies in
whose terms we know them that are socially constructed"
The rest of Fish's discussion leaves it thoroughly unclear exactly what
he
thinks this observation shows; but claims similar to his are often presented by
others as constituting yet another basis for arguing against the objectivity of
science. The resultant arguments are unconvincing.
It goes without saying that the vocabularies with which we seek
to know
the
world are socially constructed and that they therefore reflect various
contingent aspects of our capacities, limitations and interests. But it doesn't
follow that those vocabularies are therefore incapable of meeting the standards
of adequacy relevant to the expression and discovery of objective truths.
We may illustrate why by using Fish's own example. There is no doubt
that the
game of baseball as we have it, with its particular conceptions of what counts
as a `strike' and what counts as a `ball,' reflects various contingent facts
about us as physical and social creatures. `Strike' and `ball' are socially
constructed concepts, if anything is. However, once these concepts have been
defined -- once the strike zone has been specified -- there are then
perfectly
objective facts about what counts as a strike and what counts as a ball. (The
fact that the umpire is the court of last appeal doesn't mean that he can't make
mistakes.)
Similarly, our choice of one conceptual scheme rather than another, for
the
purposes of doing science, probably reflects various contingent facts about our
capacities and limitations, so that a thinker with different capacities and
limitations, a Martian for example, might find it natural to employ a different
scheme. This does nothing to show that our conceptual scheme is incapable of
expressing objective truths. Realism is not committed to there being only one
vocabulary in which objective truths might be expressed; all it's committed to
is the weaker claim that, once a vocabulary is specified, it will then be an
objective matter whether or not assertions couched in that vocabulary are true
or false.
We are left with two puzzles. Given what the basic tenets of
postmodernism are,
how did they ever come to be identified with a progressive political outlook?
And given how transparently refutable they are, how did they ever come to gain
such widespread acceptance?
In the Unites States, postmodernism is closely linked to the movement
known as
multiculturalism, broadly conceived as the project of giving proper credit to
the contributions of cultures and communities whose achievements have been
historically neglected or undervalued. In this connection, it has come to
appeal to certain progressive sensibilities because it supplies the
philosophical resources with which to prevent anyone from accusing oppressed
cultures of holding false or unjustified views.
Even on purely political grounds, however, it is
difficult to
understand how
this could have come to seem a good way to conceive of multiculturalism. For if
the powerful can't criticize the oppressed, because the central epistemological
categories are inexorably tied to particular perspectives, it also follows that
the oppressed can't criticize the powerful. The only remedy, so far as I can
see, for what threatens to be a strongly conservative upshot, is to accept an
overt double standard: allow a questionable idea to be criticized if it is held
by those in a position of power -- Christian creationism -- for example,
but not if
it is held by those whom the powerful oppress -- Zuni creationism, for
example.
Familiar as this stratagem has recently become, how can it possibly appeal to
anyone with the slightest degree of intellectual integrity; and how can it fail
to seem anything other than deeply offensive to the progressive sensibilities
whose cause it is supposed to further?
As for the second question, regarding widespread acceptance, the short
answer is
that questions about truth, meaning and objectivity are among the most difficult
and thorny questions that philosophy confronts and so are very easily
mishandled. A longer answer would involve explaining why analytic philosophy,
the dominant tradition of philosophy in the English-speaking world, wasn't able
to exert a more effective corrective influence. After all, analytic philosophy
is primarily known for its detailed and subtle discussion of concepts in the
philosophy of language and the theory of knowledge, the very concepts that
postmodernism so badly misunderstands. Isn't it reasonable to expect it to have
had a greater impact on the philosophical explorations of its intellectual
neighbors? And if it hasn't, can that be because its reputation for insularity
is at least partly deserved? Because philosophy concerns the most general
categories of knowledge, categories that apply to any compartment of inquiry, it
is inevitable that other disciplines will reflect on philosophical problems and
develop philosophical positions. Analytic philosophy has a special
responsibility to ensure that its insights on matters of broad intellectual
interest are available widely, to more than a narrow class of insiders.
Whatever the correct explanation for the current malaise, Alan Sokal's
hoax has
served as a flashpoint for what has been a gathering storm of protest against
the collapse in standards of scholarship and intellectual responsibility that
vast sectors of the humanities and social sciences are currently afflicted with.
Significantly, some of the most biting commentary has come from distinguished
voices on the left, showing that when it comes to transgressions as basic as
these, political alliances afford no protection. Anyone still inclined to doubt
the seriousness of the problem has only to read Sokal's parody.
A Letter to the Editor
Steve Fuller
Times Literary Sup.. 20 December 1996 page 17
Sir –
Although I have never considered myself much of a postmodernist, the more I have read attacks on the decision of Social Text's editors to publish Alan Sokal's bogus article, the more I sympathize with the editors. Paul Boghossian (December 13) provides a perfect example of the source of my irritation. If we should beware of cultural studies scholars passing themselves off as experts on cultural implications of contemporary science, we should even be more wary of philosophers who try to reduce cross-disciplinary scholarship to lessons in elementary logic.
Postmodernists may talk a lot about blurring 'genres', but I do not recall any of their number ever saying they wanted to blur the difference between true and false. Their claim, rather, is that the difference between true and false -- however clearly one wishes to draw it -- does not explain either the initial acceptance or the subsequent persistence of beliefs. The reason is that the embrace of truth and avoidance of falsehood is something that everyone claims for themselves and can usually demonstrate to their own satisfaction. The deeper question is how does a particular way of drawing the true/false distinction come to predominate over other possible ways. An adequate answer transcends the resources of logic and requires some understanding of the history and sociology of knowledge production. From this perspective, Boghossian's brief on behalf of 'realism' and 'objectivity' is, as philosophers like to say, 'true but trivial'.
Although I, unlike Boghossian, do not presume to be privy to the psychological make-up of Social Text's editors, their actions seem to imply that they believed Sokal's piece to be sufficiently well-crafted to merit academic discussion, which presumably includes discussion of whether or not its inferences from scientific to cultural matters are warranted. These inferences may well be unwarranted, but I would stand behind the editors in arguing that it is better to have this point revealed in open debate than to have had the article censored in the editorial board room. To my mind, Sokal does the most damage to postmodernism when his own designation of his piece as a 'hoax' is taken as the authoritative reading of it.
Reply to Letters
Paul Boghossian
TLS
January 10, 1997
Sir, - Steve Fuller (Letters, December 20) acts perhaps out of excessive modesty in failing to mention the fact that, as a contributor to the special "Science Wars" issue of Social Text in which Alan Sokal's parody appeared, he is better placed than most to explain and defend that journal's editorial decisions. Unfortunately, his letter is an example of the sort of careless argument that my article deplored.
Fuller claims never to have met a postmodernist who denies that there is a distinction between what is true and what is false. His formulation omits the crucial word "objective"; and he neglects to mention that I also consider postmodernism as a thesis about justification rather than truth. According to Fuller, postmodernists believe only the far more innocuous thesis that a belief's being true doesn't explain its acceptance or persistence. It's certainly encouraging to hear that no one asserts the extreme and, as I argued, incoherent thesis about truth. Alas, Fuller's claim here would appear to be an instance of what Raymond Tallis calls, in his eloquent and impassioned letter (January 3), one of those "U-turns conducted with such guile that no one feels the centrifugal force."
Fuller doesn't tell us whether he thinks that the truth of a belief doesn't necessarily explain its acceptance or persistence, or that it never explains it. The former thesis is so obvious that no one has ever denied it; if the truth of a belief necessarily explained its acceptance, no one would ever believe anything false. So Fuller had better mean the second thesis. But how are we to understand the claim that the truth of a belief never explains its acceptance or persistence? If I believe that there is a cup on my table, and there is a cup on my table, can't that fact sometimes enter into the causal explanation of why I believe what I believe? If, on the other hand, the claim is supposed to be that I can never justify my belief that the cup is on my table by appealing to that very fact, whose view is that supposed to contradict? To appeal to a fact, in order to justify one's belief in that very fact, would be obviously circular and self-serving. What one appeals to is not the fact itself, but the evidence at one's disposal. So I have no idea what interesting thesis Dr. Fuller wishes to attribute to postmodernism, nor how he proposes to explain postmodernist denials of the distinction between science and myth, fact and superstition, explicit examples of which are cited in my article.
Fuller also seeks to defend Social Text's decision to publish Sokal's essay by suggesting that it stemmed from their justified view that it was "sufficiently well crafted to merit academic discussion." Has he not read Sokal's essay, or even my brief summary of it? The essay contains literally dozens of claims that anyone with the least familiarity with their content would see right through, including inter alia: that the geometrical constant pi is a variable; that complex number theory, which dates from the nineteenth century and is taught to schoolchildren, is a new and speculative area of mathematical physics; that the axiom of choice in set theory is intimately related to the issue about freedom of choice in the abortion debate. Does Dr. Fuller really wish to claim that an essay that is basically a tissue of such transparent nonsense is "sufficiently well crafted to merit academic discussion?"
What is much more plausible is that the editors of Social Text were simply not qualified to judge whether Sokal's essay merited discussion and that this fact didn't hinder them in the least. This peculiar behavior seems to me call for special explanation, and I can think of nothing more compelling than to appeal to the independently confirmable fact that they have bought in on a set of misguided philosophical views that allow them to pooh-pooh the importance of reasonable argument, plausible evidence and factual correctness. There are, surely, less charitable explanations also available.
As for David Weissman's contention (Letters, December 27) that Social Text's relativism is akin to the views of Carnap, Wittgenstein, Quine and Putnam, one can at least be thankful that he does not try to beat the sort of hasty tactical retreat that Steve Fuller attempts. However, it would take more than a letter to sort out the various confusions that lead Weissman blithely to rope these important but disparate thinkers together, and to equate their views with the sort of simple-minded relativisms at issue.
Finally, Raymond Tallis wonders whether he is alone in agreeing with the general tenor of my remarks and arguments. I can assure Dr. Tallis, on the basis of the very large correspondence I've received, that he is not.
Last Modified: 24 November 1997
|